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THE SECURITY AND THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF TURKISH STRAITS 
 
Mesut Hakkı CAġIN 
Doğus University, International Relations Department, Turkey 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
During the last century, Turkish Straits witnessed two world wars and, following 
them, the Cold War tension between the NATO and Warsaw Pacts just near the 
coast of the magnificent blue waters. Also, just a decade ago the terrible Soviet 
Black Sea Armada was the main threat 
1
for NATO Alliance security strategies 
around these waters. But today, NATO has signed important agreements with 
Russia, the ex-arch-enemy of the Alliance which formulated (19+1) new security 
relationship and cooperation, also ongoing friendly common exercises with Black 
Sea riparian states naval fleets
2
 and Black Sea rapid deployment forces. Nowadays 
they are ready for humanitarian missions to protect democratic humanitarian ideas. 
All these tremendous peaceful steps exchange legal and security aspects of Turkish 
Straits in an optimistic dimension. However, up to 1,500 ships a day sail through the 
Bosphorus, Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles Straits that links the Mediterranean 
and Black Seas off the coast of habitat of more than ten millions people in Turkey. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, an increasing energy transport has been 
aimed at taking the pressure off these strategic waterways that link the Caspian Sea 
oil and gas resources to the world market.
3
 Indeed, as Dana MUNRO stressed the 
Russians were the first to import petroleum to Germany in 1883 from rich Russian 
wells in Baku. According to this, German oil market demand jumped up from 
300.000 tons to 755.199 tons in 1911, creating a big competition between Russia, 
Austria, Romania, and the USA, 
4just before the ‗‗ Great Game‘‘ oil operation in 
the region. The existing Montreux Convention allows complete freedom of passage 
both day and night, regardless of the nationality of the vessels or their cargoes.
5
        
                                                 
1 On the maritime the main axis, such as that directed against the Bosphorus-Dardaneles an operational – 
strategic assault landing would probably involve amphibious and airborne forces supported by naval surface 
combatants as well as aircraft of the navy and the air forces. See Philip A.  PETERSEN: The Southeastern TVD 
in Soviet Military Planning-The Bosphorus-Dardanelles Direction‘‘, Conference Papers, ‗‘ Strengthening 
NATO‘s Defense in the Southern Region: A 40 Th Anniversary Perspective ‗‘, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, 
1990.   
2 ―Black Sea Nations Hold Joint Exercises‖, the Russia Journal, 5 August 2002. ,   
3 Kamyar, MEHDĠYOUN : ‗‘Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Sea‘‘ American Journal of 
International Law, Vol.94, Issue 1, p.179-189, Jan.2000., Thomas, GOLTZ: ―The Caspian Oil Sweep Stokes‖, 
Nation, VOL. 205, 17.XI, 1997.  
4 Dana G.MUNRO :‘‘ The Proposed German Petroleum Monopoly‘‘‘, The American Economic Review‘‘ , 
Vol.4, Issue 2, p.315-326, June,1914.   
5 Article 2. In time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation in the 
Straits, by day and by night, under any flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities, except as 
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To respect new regulations drawn up by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), dangerous cargoes must now be given a notice in advance.  Furthermore, these 
cargoes are under a possible threat of terrorist attack after September 11, 2001.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As the world moves towards becoming an international community at the beginning 
of a new millennium, greater effects of globalization also tend to concentrate on 
economic growth supported by free trade and free markets. The growth of the 
economic productivity and transportation in international trade has been 
overwhelmingly dominated by shipping at the beginning of this century. Furthermore, 
international maritime law is trying to understand how such globalization advances be 
accomplished and human achievement could also be burdened with so much 
sustainable environmental security matters and destruction. It considers problems, 
opportunities, and key principles that have emerged in recent international 
negotiations on admiralty law. In 1977 shipping did some 95 percent of all 
international commerce by weight and over 1.1 trillion US dollars by value. 
6
 Instead, 
the major part of world‘s tanker fleet, about 80 percent controlled by the oil industry, 
either owns the ships or charters them on long term contracts.
7
 The Turkish Straits are 
one of the main important sea routes on the planet connecting Asia and Europe.  
From the ancient regime 
8
 Straits to the last century, combatant coastal states 
have been actively involved in very serious complex questions dealing WW-I and WW-
                                                                                                                                                       
provided in Article 3 below. No taxes or charges other than those authorized by Annex 1 to the present 
Convention shall be levied by the Turkish authorities on these vessels when passing in transit without calling at 
a port in the Straits. In order to facilitate the collection of these taxes or charges merchant vessels passing 
through the Straits shall communicate to the officials at the stations referred to in Article 3 their name, 
nationality, tonnage, destination and last port of call (5 Kamyar, MEHDĠYOUN : ‗‘Ownership of Oil and Gas 
Resources in the Caspian Sea‘‘ American Journal of International Law, Vol.94, Issue 1, p.179-189, Jan.2000., 
Thomas, GOLTZ: ―The Caspian Oil Sweep Stokes‖, Nation, VOL. 205, 17.XI, 1997.  
5 Dana G.MUNRO :‘‘ The Proposed German Petroleum Monopoly‘‘‘, The American Economic Review‘‘ , 
Vol.4, Issue 2, p.315-326, June,1914.   
 
6 Thorston, RIMMAN and Rigmor LINDEN: ‗‘ Shipping-How it Works‘‘ p.15, Stockholm, 1978. See, 
Lawrence JUDA: World Shipping, UNCTAD, and the New International Economic Order, International 
Organization, Vol., 35, Issue 3, p.493, Summer, 1981. On the other hand, one of the forgoing discussion is the 
world tanker cargo shipping in 1939 17.1 m dwt, to 325.2 m dwt at the 1982.UNCTAD, Review of Maritime 
Transport, 1982, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat; OECD, Maritime Transport, Paris, 1983, See, Alan C. 
CAFRUNY, ‗‘The Political Economy of International Shipping: Europe Versus America‘‘, International 
Organization, Vol.39, Issue 1, p.79-19, Winter, 1985. 
7 Bernhard J. ABRAHAMSON : ‗‘ The Marine Environment and Ocean Shipping : Some Implications for a 
New Law of the Sea‘‘ International Organization, Vol.31, Issue 2, Restructing Ocean Regimes: Implications of 
the Third United Nations Confernce on the Law of Sea, p.291, 311, Spring,1977. 
8 Troy Wars, Persian Armies, Roman Empire Soldiers, Christendom Attacks, Byzantine  Armies, Arab 
Challengers, finally the Turkish Troops captured and controlled Turkish Straits initially the Gallipoli step to 
European continent, in 1356 also following Istanbul faiths by the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Han in 1453..  See, 
Mesut Hakkı, CAġIN: ’’ Dünya Deniz UlaĢımında Marmara Denizi ve Türk Boğazlarının XXI. Yüzyılda 
DeğiĢen Stratejik Vizyonu‘‘Ibid, ―100 Soruda Türk Boğazları‖, Genelkurmay Basımevi, 2002, Feridun Cemal 
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II of national security balance with such rights like allowing passage for warship 
vessels or commercial ships through the Straits. They were adopted and modified as 
well as multilateral conventions between the mare liberum and mare clausum, and have 
legitimized the rules of maritime law in the 20
th
 century. This article aims to 
concentrate exclusively on the events of Turkish Straits from the WW-I until today, and 
provides Montreux Regime concepts as a basis for understanding the 20
th
 century crisis 
behavior of the actors. In this article, we aim to discuss changing balances around the 
navigation safety broadened on the basis of threats and innocent passage discussions. In 
this regard, we need to study the reasonable legal and institutional solutions that bring 
preventive measures rather than tearing down the bridges for navigation safety from 
more than one perspective.  
The passage right of the Turkish Straits by foreign naval forces was only one of 
the security elements in the 20
th
 century but it was perhaps the key instrument in 
Turkish diplomacy and defense policies. Indeed, the rivalry
9
 of the Ottomans and 
Russians, two powerful neighbors of the Eurasian Empires, for the control of Black Sea 
and the strategic Turkish Straits was crucial to the growing importance for the reality of 
international geopolitics. Nevertheless, at the heart of the understanding recently 
developments about the Turkish Straits legal matters, of course, requires detailed 
explanations after the 1936 Montreux Convention regime. Unfortunately, what we 
usually regard as long historical large scale naval operations for controlling the Turkish 
Straits with the interests of actors has been established within the limits of international 
law. Therefore, the high contracted parties have been legislated by force to present all 
relevant evidence in the sprit of treaties, 
10
 the nature of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, 
geographical, ecological, technical, military, economical, political and diplomatic 
procedures on the maritime law which result from main differences among the other 
international straits. 
11
The conflict surrounding these important waterways still prevails 
                                                                                                                                                       
Erkin: Türk-Sovyet ĠliĢkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi, Ankara 1968., Ali, KURUMAHMUT: ―Uluslararası 
Boğazlardan GeçiĢ ve Türk Boğazları‘Nin Hukuki Statüsü‖, Harp Akademileri Basım Evi, Yenilevent, Ġstanbul, 
1999. , Cemal, TUKĠN: Boğazlar Meselesi ‗‘Yayına hazırlayan, Bülent AKSOY, Ġstanbul, 1996. , Kemal 
Baltalı: 1936-1956 Yılları Arasında Boğazlar Meselesi, Ankara, 1959.  
9 .C. HUREWITZ:  ―Russia and Turkish Straits: A Revaluation of the Origins of the Problem‖, World Politics, 
Vol.14, Issue 4, p.605, July 1962.  
10 At the Treaty of Sevres, provided an absolute guarantee of the freedom passage right‘s to warships and 
commercial ships of the Straits by leaving Turkish Armed Forces in status demilitarized under the control of 
Straits Commission.  But, the Turks were able to successfully to resist the imposition of the Treaty of Sevres. 
The Turks at Lausanne stood firmly and consistently on the platform of their National Pact of 1919, they were 
fights for their principles, which asserted the rights of Turkey to a full sovereign status on equality with all other 
nations. Following the negotiation of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey rejected old diplomacy and former 
capitulations.  See: Philip Marshall, BROWN: ‗‘ From Sevres to Lausanne ‗‘ American Journal of International 
Law, Volume 18, Issue 1, p.113-116, January 1924.   
11 The evolution of general rules legal regime of the straits from historical expression challenges has long 
formulation problems between the big maritime states and territorial states. This, of course, has deal with as part 
of the general question of right of passage through straits such as Bab El Mandeb, Dover, Gibraltar, Hormuz, 
Malacca, Lombok serve as routes for the bulk of the words shipping trade. Essentially, the general right of free 
passage through these important strategic shock-points has rooted in the general principles of customary law 
that applied in the general term‘s law of sea. Which regarded the critical balance of vital security interests 
between the coastal state sovereignty and maritime powers? Moreover, because unnecessary increased costs 
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today, though, not using military force used as it was in the past. At the present stage, 
the problem of Turkish Straits is primarily economic and political. However, in order to 
understand the recent picture, we should look at the previous settlements in the history. 
 
 
1. CHANGING THE LEGAL STATUS OF TURKISH STRAITS FROM THE 
CRIMEAN WAR TO THE GREAT WAR 
 
After the Ottoman Empire had increased its maritime power, the Black Sea became 
the internal sea of the Ottoman Empire, and as a result, Istanbul became the Omni-
power to determine the Black Sea Straits regime. The 1809 Kale-i Sultaniyye Treaty 
with Great Britain since Russia followed 1774 Küçük Kaynarca Treaty was signed 
with Russia right after the wars 
12
and France decided to have an alliance against 
England. 
13
 The next step was the Treaty of London concluded by the four powers 
(Russia, Great Britain, Prussia and Austria) in 1841, which completely changed the 
situation, establishing the regime of closing the Straits to foreign warships in the time 
of peace only. This agreement, accepted by other powers, later became a part of 
public order between the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) and the Western European 
powers. After the 1856 Paris Agreement, on March 13, 1871 the Treaty of London 
was accepted, which became the fundamental ground of the Black Sea Straits regime 
until the WW-I. Its sense was formulated as follows: "No Foreign warships allowed 
into the Straits as long as the Porte is at peace". The situation completely changed 
after the WW- I broke out. But the Crimean War was a corner stone for the future 
power balances and Western-Ottoman relations at end of the 17
th
 century. 
After the Crimean War, British changed their policy for the status of straits. 
According to Lord Campbell the ―best fatal‖ operation route was the Black Sea. On 
this latitude, the English side notified the Turkish Government on the passage 
permission for the British Fleet to enter the Black Sea. 
14
 The English Naval Fleet 
decided to design new warships carrying ―oil only‖; considering its advantages over 
the coal usage; not only speed supremacy but also the benefits of cutting on personnel 
and costs, 
15
 but increased capability more than 40%. By that time the English Naval 
Fleet built 189 vessels and raised the oil demand from 20.000 tons to 200.000 tons in 
                                                                                                                                                       
resulting from an efficient or restrictive straits regime ultimately will be borne by all, this commercial interest is 
substantial even for nations, see: John Norton, MOORE: ―The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea‖, American Journal of International Law, Vol.74, p.81, Jun.1980.   
12 Mahmut R. BELĠK : ‗‘ Türk Boğazlarının Hukuki Statüsü ‗‘, Ġstanbul, 1962. 
13 Rıfat , UÇAROL : ‗‘ DeğiĢmekte Olan Dünyada Türk Boğazlarının Önemi ve Geleceği ‗‘ , Yeni Dünya 
Düzeni ve Türkiye, Derleyen, Sabahattin, ġEN , sf.165-202, Ġstanbul,1992. . 
14 P.P. GRAVES: ―The Question of the Straits‖, p.137, London, 1931, S. GORALNOW: ―Le Bosphore ET Les 
Dardanelles‖, p.383-384, Trans by. Ġskender Macar, Ali ReĢat, ―Devlet-i Osmaniye Rusya Siyaseti‖, Ġstanbul, 
1331.  
15 Admiralty Committee on the Use of Oil Fuel in the Navy, 25 April 1912, A. Trover, DAWSON, 
F.W.BLACK; Director of Navy Contracts, Engineer Rear-Admiral W.H. RILEY, Churchill to Fisher, 26 May 
1912, WSC Comp. Vol.II, pt.iii, p.1928.        
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1911.
16
 Although these changing strategic material demands and wartime supply, 
Dreadnought oil requirements created to find oil supply in ―sufficient quantities‖ and 
at a ―reasonable price‖, and thus, resulted in new challenges with Germany to control 
the ―Oil Supply‖ regions for Naval Power which dominated in Mediterranean and 
Mesopotamia.
17
 It should be underlined that, Germany was one of the most important 
players about the Turkish Straits security diplomacy during the WW-I and WW-II. As 
CHADWICK stressed, Germany continued to appeal to challenge British diplomacy 
in Far East, Mediterranean, Egypt, and North Africa by establishing Naval Force from 
Atlantic to the Black Sea. In order to achieve this aim Germany planned to increase 
her naval construction capacity, without reflecting that is requested her national 
growth and growing people armaments are the instrument by which expansion is 
achieved. 
18The Admiral Von Tirpitz shaped Germany‘s naval building program and 
their political aims. He was the architect of developing a naval power as an instrument 
for the establishment of Germany and as a world power by building of a German 
battle fleet. British decision-makers wanted to eliminate German‘s naval threat to 
their security. Also, they determined that a strategic alliance between Germany and 
the Ottoman Empire would be important considering the oil demands in the future of 
Middle East. This fear brought in maritime history a big competition between the 
German and British naval forces just before the war. 
19
 
Why Britain suddenly turned traditional Turkish Alliance down and applied an 
arms embargo on the Turkish cruisers? I think considering the future oil supply 
question was one of the important reasons to gain regional control ability by the 
British manipulation on the Ottoman Empire‘s Middle East territories via using Arab 
nationalism. For that reason, rising possible strong Germany-Ottoman Empire 
cooperation on the oil field rights would be against the British vital interests.  The 
British side‘s consideration for supplies of oil from Mesopotamia might or might not 
eventually be required for naval purposes and the establishment of the perpetuation of 
British control in the region. This aim had become the sine qua non-of British 
Strategy which, counter balances
20
 allowing Russia to Istanbul and the Turkish Straits, 
and providing for a logical bargain. Great Britain had decided to change its policies on 
the Turkish Straits considering the ―ill and therefore weak‖ Ottoman Strategy. The 
maintenance of close and friendly relations with the Turks was against the Anglo-
Russian Convention interests and German influence in the Middle East.
 21
  
                                                 
16 Winston, CHURCHILL: ―Oil Fuel Supply for His Majesty's Navy‖, 16 June 1913, PRO Cab 37/115/39.  
17 Dumas to Nicholson, with Enclosures, 19 Nov. 1912, PRO, FO 800/360, M.KENT: ―Oil and Empire, British 
Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 1900-1920‖, p.38-39, London, 1976.  
18 F.E.CHADWICK : ‗‘ The Anglo-German Tension and a Solution‘‘, American Journal of International  Law, 
Volume 6, Issue 3, p.601- 613, July,1912.  
19 Mesut Hakkı CAġIN : ‗‘Strategic Effects of WW-I for the International Security Balances in the Middle East 
‗‘ Ibid. 
20 Sir Edmund, BARROW: Military Secretary, India Office, ―Military Situation in the Middle East‖, 25 Jan 
1915, PRO Cab 37/123/50.   
21 Heeler p.98 Lowe Docrill, in G.MILLER, Ibid, & I "British policy" p.146-147.  
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Why did Russia form an alliance with Great Britain for their interests in 
Turkish Straits? What were the Russian side‘s strategic concerns about the Ottoman-
German Alliance and Turkish Straits control?   
Russia's interest in the Straits was both complex and shared by other states. 
Russian policymakers had been seriously concerned with the Straits since Catherine II 
made Russia a riparian power on the Black Sea. In terms of total value of trade, over 
1906-13 the southern ports averaged 26.1 percent of the total Russian international 
trade, while the Baltic ports averaged 30.4 percent over the same period. More 
crucially, the Black Sea ports were the gateway largely for exports, while the majority 
of imports came through the northern ports. Russia's naval interests in the Straits began 
to change shortly before Sazonov became foreign minister in 1910. Russia's southern 
coast had long been protected by the prohibition against the passage of foreign warships 
through the Straits without the Sultan's permission, but from the time of the Russo-
Japanese War this prohibition proved more a hindrance than help. During that war, St. 
Petersburg had been unable to send reinforcements from the Black Sea to the Pacific. 
The Straits regime thus played a critical part in Russia's sense of national security. 
Before the Balkan wars, efforts to change this situation had begun. Diplomatically, 
there had been two notable Russian attempts to change the Straits regime. Sazonov then 
explained the resolution that would best suit those needs. First, he dismissed 
internationalization of Constantinople and neutralization of the Straits as an insufficient 
guarantee of Russia's key interests. Land or sea forces could be used to violate any 
treaty that disarmed these areas, threatening both the closure of the Straits and the 
penetration of other Powers' warships into the Black Sea. ―Russia must not rely on 
written agreements‖, Sazonov concluded, ―but instead must physically assure its vital 
interests at this crucial waterway‖. Finding such an arrangement, of course, was no easy 
matter. The radical option was to seize Constantinople and the Straits by force. Such an 
arrangement would give Russia several advantages, including control of a center of 
world trade and a "key to the Mediterranean Sea."
22
 
Sazonov's preferred option was to control the upper Bosphorus, once further 
Turkish role there was impossible, either as an outright possession or through a 
long-term lease. Most important, a fortified position on the Bosphorus would allow 
St. Petersburg to prevent any hostile ships from entering the Black Sea. 
Constantinople itself could be internationalized, and the Dardanelles stripped of any 
fortifications. Under such an arrangement, Sazonov hypothesized; the strengthening 
of the Russian Black Sea Fleet would allow Russia freedom of passage through the 
Dardanelles. In this manner, Russia would occupy a minimum of territory but acquire 
a significant change in its rights at the Straits. Russia would also have made an 
important first step toward someday acquiring the whole region. From this analysis, 
then, certain things stand out in Sazonov's attitude toward Constantinople and the 
                                                 
22 Ronald, BOBROFF: ‗‘ Behind the Balkan Wras : Rusian Policy Toward Bulgaria And the Turkish 
Straits,1912-1913,Russian Review, An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia Past & Present, Vol.59, Issue 1, 
Jan.2000.  
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Straits. 
23
Potential German control of the Straits was an issue of immense gravity for 
Russia. As Minister of the Navy J.K.Grigorovich wrote Sazonov late in 1913, ‗‘ 
Russia cannot allow another power to dominate the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, 
for the Straits in the hands of another power state would mean the control of the 
economic development of southern Russia. A foreign power could transfer to that 
state of the hegemony of the Balkans and the key to Asia Minor.‘‘24 The question of 
the Black Sea Straits became one of the main topics of the President Wilson address 
to the joint session of USA Congress on January 8, 1918 (the 12th one of the famous 
14 points): "...the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to 
the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees". Detailed 
discussions of the status of Constantinople and the Straits took place at the Paris 
Peace Conference, but no solution was reached before the Treaty of Lausanne 
signature (July 24, 1923). The Lausanne Convention of the Straits, presented on July 
24 1923 was composed of twenty articles with an annex to Article 2, concerning the 
rules of commercial and war vessels and aircraft forces throughout the region of the 
Straits passage.  
 
 
2. THE REMILITARIZATION OF THE TURKISH STRAITS UNDER THE 
MONTREUX CONVENTION REGIME 
 
The changing power balances and vital interests of Big Powers, especially Anglo-
American and Soviet Union, considering German-Italian predominance threat 
around the Mediterranean-Persian Gulf oil regions interests totally modified their 
policies to a friendly situation contrary to WW-I desires.
25
 On 10 April 1936, the 
Turkish government, in a note, requested that the Lausanne Treaty signatories and 
the Secretary-General of the League, Joseph Avenol, call a conference to revise the 
Straits Convention. Turkey declared that when the Lausanne Convention was 
signed, the European situation presented a totally different aspect which had come to 
existence. Ankara's request for revision of the Straits Convention by negotiation had 
thrown Turkey's weight on the side of international law and peaceful revision.     
                                                 
23 Leading this effort, Foreign Minister Sergei D. Sazonov repeatedly made clear that his government could 
allow no power, large or small, the opportunity to control the Straits save for Turkey or, ultimately, Russia. His 
policy was the preservation of the status quo at the Straits for as long as possible, until Russia would be able to 
take them over itself. Long the subject of historical investigation, the centrality of the Straits question in Russian 
diplomacy has been accepted by all sides of the debate, even with some  differences of interpretation over the 
primacy of the issue vis-a-vis the need to contain the expansionism of the Germanic empires. First, he believed 
that any arrangement would have to satisfy Russian needs on the ground, for no written agreement could protect 
Russia's economic, military, and cultural interests there. Second, while Sazonov was fully aware of 
Constantinople's and the Straits' potential importance to the Russian Empire, the current threat of Austrian 
expansion outweighed them in his calculations. Here, then, was not some blind, romantic pursuit of traditional 
aspirations, but a calculated appraisal of Russia's strategic position.  
24 Zakher, Kransyi Arhiv, 7, :33-34, CF, Un livre noir, . Diplomatitie d‘anavt – guerre d‘apres les documents 
des archieves russes, 3, vols, p.365, Paris, 1922-1927, William a. RENZI: great Britain, Russia and the Straits, 
1914-1915, THE Journal of Modern History, Vol.42, Issue, 1, p.1-20, MARCH,1970.  
25 HOWARD :  Ibid.  
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The Montreux Convention was a victory for Turkey, for its friends in the Balkan 
Entente, and for the policy of regional pacts. In the eyes of Western observers, 
Turkey's peaceful, diplomatic and lawful approach to revision of the Lausanne Straits 
Convention was welcomed contrasting Hitler's unilateral action in the Rhineland and 
Mussolini‘s aggression in Ethiopia. 26 The High Contractor Parties, considering 
development existing strategic power balance and ―rebus sic stantibus‖ principles, 
decided to change the existing status quo through the Montreux Convention in 1936. 
27
The Montreux Convention Regime recognized the reestablishment Turkish 
Sovereignty over the Turkish Straits region in consistent with the ―Right to 
Remilitarize‖ the zone.28 Also, the Convention provided for a key to new provisions, 
that regulated commercial vessels to enter Straits by day and transit by route indicated 
by Turkish authorities (Art. 6) and introduced concrete limits for warships belong to 
non-Black Sea powers; for Black Sea powers insignificant limits (Art. 13-18). When 
we evaluate Turkey‘s role in detail we will see it as a successful guardian of the 
Straits during the WW-II against the progress of ―violent action‖ against of the 
belligerent parties.  This was addressed not only by the French Governor‘s observers 
but also stressed by Anthony De Luca.
29
 
It‘s very interesting that, both the Soviet Union and Great Britain wished ―to 
see Turkey strong and prosperous‖.30 But, in Hitler‘s view, about the Turkey ―never 
be an enemy of the Axis‖, and it‖ would remain neutral to the end of the war‖.31  
Because, Von PAPEN expressed his views to ĠNÖNÜ that ‖the British Fleet would 
support the Russian Flank in the Black Sea and a convenient way for defense of the 
Caucasus would be found‖.32Churchill and Eden desired to play the ―Turkish Card‖ 
whether in munitions or diplomatic proposals without delay. During the Casablanca 
Conference, they brought up the issue of the ―Turkish Straits‖ to force the country to 
join the war.
33
 However, INONU was very careful against these intentions. His 
explanations for security balance, favored guarantees, substantial munitions and 
reinforcement of Turkish Armed Forces in the event of attack.
34
Turkey during the war 
strictly kept the general regime of the Montreux Convention, which mainly was 
served and supported Soviets and British interests during the WW-II.  It was also 
natural that the Turkish Government should have pursued a cautious policy 
                                                 
26Yücel,GÜÇLÜ:‘Regulation of the Passage the Turkish Straits ‗‘ Perceptions,   Journal of International Affairs, 
Volume VI -  Number 1,  March - May 2001.                  
27 Sevin, TOLUNER: ―Milletlerarası Hukuk Dersleri‖, sf.l64-165, Ġstanbul, 1989, Aslan, GÜNDÜZ: 
―Milletlerarası Temel Hukuk, Temel Belgeler, Örnek Kararlar‖, sf.218-219, Ġstanbul, 1998, Seha, MERAY: 
―Devletler Hukukuna GiriĢ‖, sf.154—155, AÜHF Yayın No. 206, Ankara, 1975.   
28 Montreux Boğazlar Konferansı, Tutanaklar ve Belgeler, Çev. Seha L.Meray, Osman Olcay, p. 287-434, 
A.Ü.S.B.F. No.390, Ankara, 1976.     
29 Anthony R. De LUCA: ―Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits‖; Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol.92, Issue 3, p.503-524, Autumn, 1977.    
30 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.377, No.20, Col.37.  
31 Von, PAPEN: ―Memories‖, Translated by Brian, CONNEL, p.485-487, Andre, DEUTCH: 1952.   
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throughout this period. Contrary to the WW-II threat and tensions near the borders of 
Turkey, German troop‘s hands were tied and unable to breathe properly.  The 
occupation of the Aegean Islands which was the main lead to Turkish Straits was not 
a desirable choice to involve as a belligerent party. Prime Minister Ġsmet ĠNÖNÜ and 
Chief of General Staff Fevzi ÇAKMAK kept to the foreign policy principles of 
Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK‘s which meant ―There is no desire at all to obtain 
territorial gain‖, and it considered against Atlantic-Euro-Pacific front for the 
possibility of not involving a conflict threat by sticking to the principle of 
―neutrality‖.  Thanks to Ġsmet Ġnönü's astute leadership, Turkey managed to stay out 
of WW- II, maintaining formal neutrality right through the end of the war. On the 
other hand, Anthony de Luca stressed that in effect the grand strategy of the United 
States as the defenders of Turkish integrity and independence about the issue of 
Turkish Straits actually just behind WW-II Soviets pressures upon Turkey; since its 
strategic geopolitical situation. According the to Anthony R. De LUCA: ―Soviet-
American Politics and the issue of Turkish Straits actually just behind WW-II Soviets 
pressures upon Turkey; since its strategic geopolitical situation.
35
 Indeed, Washington 
looked with apprehension upon Turkish Straits about the free passage right issue ―to be 
open to merchant vessels at all times‖ possession of the keys to their house‖.36  
  
 
3. NEW ENVIRONMENT SECURITY PROBLEMS AROUND THE TURKISH 
STRAITS 
 
There are different questions about the maritime law, which dominated the meaning 
of environmental safety and free passage rights. We aimed to answer these questions 
within the legal arguments of about the straits and freedom of innocent passage: What 
are the main elements of innocent passage phenomena?  What if any ship gives 
causes hazard to either territorial waters of coastal states, or it is against 
environmental security and vital interests of a state? Regardless of national or 
international dimensions, can we accept this illegal action as being ―innocent‖? 
H.GROTIUS stressed that ―one who has occupied a part of the sea cannot hinder 
navigation which is without weapons and of innocent intent‖.37 Netherlands argued 
before the 1930 Hague Codification Conference, the right of free passage as 
customary law for all ships only in straits ―which may be regarded as main routes of 
                                                 
35
 Anthony R. De LUCA: ―Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits‖, Political Science Quarterly, 
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communication”. But, the Italian delegate stated at the Conference that ―as a general 
role, all straits which are of general concern to word shipping are already governed 
by special regulations.
38
 However, innocent passage termed “inoffensive‖ navigation 
moves. Such as Rousseau, defines‖ who does not have opportunity nor intention to do 
wrong‖39 We can determine in this point that manner of passage do not reflect to 
coastal state national security or independence of the state rights. STRUPP remarked 
in 1934 that ―as for as straits are concerned, the most important ones, such as the 
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, fall under a special conventional regime and exceed 
therefore our context, there is virtually no settled, generally accepted rule”.40 In 1956 
the International Law Commission stated the innocence based on behavior or manner: 
―Passage is innocent so long as a ship does not use the territorial sea for committing 
any acts prejudicial to the security of the coastal State or contrary to the present rules, 
or to other rules of international law‖.41 ―Once again, since the Turkish Straits have 
special rules for individual cases, after 1956 Convention Commission Reports, the 
Turkish government stated that the existing rules relating to straits did not lend 
themselves to conditions affecting the regimes of straits are and by nature ought to be 
widely divergent.
42
  
Recently, the navigation safety and marine environment problems are 
important in around the Turkish Straits. If the rule of UN Convention Article Part 
XII: “States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment‖ is 
correct; the rights and duties of coastal states and flag states have to be carefully 
protected against pollution or violations of navigation safety. In this context, an 
objective analysis of Turkey‘s attention will show the efforts behind the Montreux 
Convention for longer than six decades. However, considering end of the Cold War 
transformation around the Europe and Eurasia, it is necessary to an amend the 
Convention, or a better solution is required to set rules for the safety of navigation 
addressing international law rebus sic stantibus rule.  Will Turkey attempt to 
prevent, reduce and control possible pollution threats as well as being a coastal state 
cooperating with international organizations and their actors? On the other hand, the 
Montreux Convention well-established principle remains in force. There is no 
official application for radical revision circumstances under Article 28 of the 
Convention and 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties Article 62(1) 
(b). It should be used in the parties‘ demands. Is there any attempt in this way? 
However, if there is such a requirement recently or in the future about the present 
convention, which kind of modalities of transmits if shall become obvious for 
further development in free passage and environment safety rules in creating legal 
framework? In this regard, especially argued in this article, should be balanced with, 
                                                 
38 S. ROSENNE: ―League of Nations Conference for the Codification of International La‖, The Hague, p.58-
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41 YBILC 272-3, aj, See Also, MM. WHITEMAN: ―Digest of International Law‖, p.353, Washington DC, 
1965.  
42 YBILC ―Yearbook of the International Law Commission‖, 73, A/CN 4/99, C4, 21, 1956.   
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inter alia between the flag states important strait state navigation safety and 
environmental security interests. The potential utilization maritime transport, 
hazardous cargo, nuclear waste transportation and oil spill accidents have created 
threats to the Black Sea and Turkish Straits causing hazards to the environment and 
ecology of the area. Turkey has decided to establish maritime traffic control system 
and traffic separation schemes where necessary to promote safe passage for ships 
and to look at the problem as a part navigation safety for keeping track with the 
changing conditions and maritime environment. 
43
 Of course, one of the most 
important security matters is terrorist attacks to shipping cargo tankers after the 
September 11 attacks.
44
 A new argument after September 11 tragic attack in New 
York and Pentagon that US territorial integrity by international terror organizations 
can engage a considerable range of risks and possible security affects in the future, 
which was not taken up in the Montreux Convention directly. 
Of course, the Convention is in force since 1936, nearly half a century including 
periods of war and tension, without being amended or terminated, in spite of its 
provisions to that effect. This is a concrete proof of the fact that it has served well the 
interests of all the states concerned, so much so that, although there have been 
objections from time to time to some of its provisions, especially those regarding the 
passage of vessels of war. They are in fact in the nature of special provisions as 
compared with the general rules of international law. No contracting state ventured the 
revision of the Convention up to the present time
45
. It is unquestionable that Turkey had 
accepted the principle of the freedom of passage for merchant vessels. Nevertheless, once 
again, despite the use of the term “free of passage” the preparatory work of the 
conference clearly demonstrates that in recognized the right of freedom of passage for 
merchant vessels this right was subject to Turkey‘ authority. This ‗policy navigation‘ and 
to ensure that passage be ‗inoffensive‟ or „innocent‟ The Montreux Convention thus 
created regime of passage for merchant vessels that incorporated the general principles of 
an innocent passage regime but in addition, included unique conditions of passage. Free 
passage and navigation in the Turkish Straits for merchant vessels is a limited freedom 
subject to the interests of Turkey to protect its territorial welfare. A clear understanding of 
the meaning of ―freedom of passage and navigation through the Turkish Straits as 
provided for by the Montreux Convention is of great importance in light of the continuing 
objections raised by Turkey‘s Balkan and Black Sea neighbors at IMO platforms46. 
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However, unless we devise a better way to make international law for the environment, 
future progress is likely to be piecemeal, fitful, unsystematic and even random. If the 
appropriate steps are not taken now, the manifestly unsatisfactory situation we have will 
limp along towards crisis. 
47
 
Black Sea exports, however, must pass through the increasingly crowded the 
Istanbul Strait. Traditional export routes through Black Sea ports have been running at 
full capacity, and environmental concerns about the possibility of oil spills in the Turkish 
Straits increase. 
48
 On the other hand, considering general energy marketing dynamics, 
Kazakhstan may also increase oil export capacity by using Turkish Straits especially for 
the next 25 to 50 years. It might be argued that in November 1998, the Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium, a joint venture of three governments and several companies, reached 
agreement on the construction, by mid-2001, of a Tengiz-Novorossiysk pipeline
49
. Its 
initial throughput capacity is projected to be 28 million tons per annum (MTPA), 
subsequently rising to a maximum of 67 MTPA
50
. These developments show that 
transiting vessels of hydrocarbons under the potential risk trends in mid and long term. 
Average ship traffic has measured about 700 ships during the Montreux Convention 
signed in 1936. But, because of above mentioned factors and beginning Caspian Sea oil 
transport into the market, heavy shipping traffic dramatically increased %150 skip 
tonnage and %400 numbers of these vessels. Although, the Black Sea was always open 
under the Montreux Regime to all merchant ships of all littoral and third states, the 
amount of maritime traffic is steadily increasing since the opening trade routes through 
Bulgaria-Romania-Ukraine-Russia-Georgia facilitated the integration with the Western 
Markets. Thus, the economic commercial importance has replaced the previous military 
significance. Furthermore, the European Union recently agreed to clear the Danube 
River, blocked since the 1999 NATO‘s Kosovo Operation. 51 
 In March 1994, a dramatic accident occurred in the Istanbul Strait, very near 
to the entrance to the Black Sea. The 100.000-ton oil tanker Nassia collided with a 
cargo ship the Shipbroker, which exploded and ran ashore, killing most of its crew. 
The stricken Nassia caught fire and released over 1000 tons of oil to the sea, causing 
extensive environmental damage. This incident, one of many which occur in the 
busy and winding Bosphorus, is a sharp reminder of the risks involved in 
transporting oil and the poor state of preparedness of Black Sea countries in the 
event of an accident.  These passages and shipment results have been evident with 
critical navigation safety threats with dramatic accidents and oil spills that polluted 
Turkish Straits like Greek Ship Evryali and Romanian tanker Independenta. The 
100.000 ton oil tanker Nassia collided with a cargo ship the Shipbroker which 
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exploded and ran ashore, killing most of its crew.
52
 Finally Russian oil ship 
Volganeft 248, which sunk down in Marmara Sea after structural failure causing an 
environmental disaster. 1279 tons of heavy fuel-oil was spilled into the sea during 
Volganeft 248 incident affecting a 5 kilometer. Long shoreline. It sank down at a 30 
meter-depth of sea water. This part was salvaged without causing any pollution 
damages to the environment in the Sea of Marmara. 
53
  All these serious accidents 
have brought Turkish authorities to make decisions about navigation control and 
safety rules and to declare new traffic control measures and Traffic Separation 
Schemes-TSS. This declaration was supplemented by assurances that Turkey‘s 
concerns were mainly security and environmental safety reasons, and in no way 
were they intended a revision of the Montreux Convention.
54
 However, the other 
Black Sea coastal states, especially Russia, have resisted against the implementation 
process of the Montreux Convention.  Russia asserted that it was technically safe for 
very ‗‘large vessels‘‘ to pass, and those only large vessels over 340 m. long and 
‗‘deep drought vessels‘‘ with a maximum draught of 17.6 m. or more required to 
take special measures and precautions. It suggested no upper size limit for transiting 
vessels.
55
 Russia has asserted that `when the status of the TSS is changed, it leads to 
difficulties for captains so far as application of the COLREGS is concerned. 
56
It has 
to underline that Turkey established a communication links between the Black Sea 
coastal states and IMO in order to develop TSS. These efforts finally accepted by the 
IMO, and the results have decreased the accidents after their implementation.  More 
reliable modes should be established after TSS and VTS operation modes.  As the 
PLANT emphasized that largely as a result of the US support, 
57
 Turkey was able to 
fight a Russian rearguard action
58
 at the 69th Session of the Maritime Safety 
Committee, in May 1998, by promising to co-operate in future discussions in IMO of 
all aspects of safety of navigation in the Straits. This was interpreted by the 
Committee Chairman to include a review of the IMO Rules and Recommendations. 
59
 
Turkey thus secured a decision to take no further action on the existing NAV Sub-
Committee report and defer the matter of preparing a new report to the next session of 
the Sub-Committee.
60
 This is regarded as a major victory, and viewing the subsequent 
events need to be considered.  
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According to Article 17 of UNCLOS, ―ships of all States … enjoy the right of 
innocent passage through the territorial sea.‖ Furthermore, pursuant to Article 21(1), 
61
 also Article 22(3) of UNCLOS, ―the Coastal State shall take due notice of the 
competent international organization,‖ the coastal State shall take due notice of the 
recommendations of the competent international organization,‖ together with 21(6), 
appear to favor the transfer of the environmental approach to routing measures from 
the IMO to coastal States. However, Article 22(3) directs that in designating a sea-
lane ―the coastal State shall take into account … (b) any channels customarily used 
for international navigation.‖ Besides, Article 22(2) already established the possibility 
of adopting routing measures for environmental reasons, as well as for the security of 
maritime traffic, even though when certain types of ships are involved it reads that‖ 
… tankers, nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently 
dangerous or noxious substances… They may be required to confine their passage to 
such sea lanes.‖  The second requirement is expressed in Article 24(1) of UNCLOS: 
―The coastal State shall not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships through the 
territorial sea. Except in accordance with this Convention…‖ A valid interpretation of 
this provision would be that the coastal State can forbid navigation in protected sea 
areas but it cannot outlaw the passage of ships in the full breadth of the territorial sea. 
The question remains, however, whether satisfactory results will materialize if 
adequacy technologies to meet environmental standards. Indeed, the general directives 
of UNCLOS III present key problems to international enforcement of the treaty. 
Under Article 192, States have the obligation ‗‘ to protect and preserve the marine 
environment‟‟. This protection and preservation, is achieved by both individual and 
collective member-state action under Article 194: "States shall . . . reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best 
practical means at their disposal. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
It‘s a reality that, nevertheless, there have been critical oil spill and pollution threat 
and causes serious environmental damages not only in Turkish Straits, but also the 
Black Sea is under this potential risk. However, protecting the Straits as a coastal state 
is not only in Turkey‘s responsibility since any disaster could close the Straits relating 
vital interest of all the riparian states of the Black Sea and the international maritime 
community. We have to remember that history taught us that unilateral restrictions on 
navigational safety could not accomplish to reach purposes without personnel who 
have a strong belief in their benefits. In this regard, coastal & flag states need 
reasonable balances of interests in innocent passages and have contribute to a stable 
legal order. From this multi-channel efficient communication perspective, the 
Montreux Convention guarantees to perform protection environmental disasters if the 
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parties combine their efforts in bona fide manner with respect to environmental 
sensitivity.  In this regard of these indicators, first ‗‘Conflict Scenario‘‘, tanker and oil 
traffic should continue dangerously to threat the Turkish Straits navigation safety and 
environment security concerns. In the second ‗‘ International Cooperation Scenario‟‟, 
to reduce heavy tanker traffic and eliminate the any possible environmental threat 
through the Turkish Straits, the international community, IMO, UNEP, NATO 
CCMS, Black Sea states, Caspian Sea states also environmental NGO‘s and IGO‘s 
develop cooperation efforts which secured solutions for navigation safety. The third 
scenario is; in spite of Turkey‘s traffic regime implementation, VTS application 
efforts with IMO and other institutions may be faced with a breakdown point after 
very serious accidents. If the existing tanker traffic creates threats to Turkish Straits 
and local navigation safety rules, Turkey unitarily should increase the regime control, 
which declared under the Montreux preamble of territorial security concerns. 
As Bayram ÖZTÜRK indicated that, the major significant threats to marine life 
growing the ecological and environmental security concepts originates part of ship – 
oriented marine pollution threat not only around the Turkish Straits and, but also in 
the Black Sea and Aegean Sea ecological life and going to crucial international legal 
problem together with technological progress and rapid growth of energy transport.  
Also the health of Turkish Straits System, is vital for the protection of the Black Sea 
and Mediterranean Sea and their marine biodiversity 
62
 Furthermore, we have to keep 
in mind that, the advance in environmental law affected by the Convention, is 
reflected in the unfettered clarity of the opening article of Part XII ‗‘ states have the 
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment ‗‘. 63 Thus, it also provides 
for environmental impact of planned activities for pollution emergencies and force 
major casualties around the straits. In this regard, basically, the states, UNEP, UN 
Convention on the Law of Sea, the IMO are required tasks to cooperate in establishing 
regional and global applicable and generally acceptable rules and standards to 
eliminate sources and results of marine pollution around the straits. The 
implementation of marine pollution control standards will be costly, and freight rates 
will be high. However, the in principle higher cost of maritime transport and 
navigation is aimed to protect the environment and marine ecology is simply the price 
paid for the protection and preservation of universal a city of Istanbul civilization 
habitat and heritage which accepted by the UN, one of the world‘s most beautiful  
international city. 
In addition to this problem, after expressing international terror in September 
11 in the US, the possible risk and threat potential bring some of the deployments 
around the Turkish Straits, especially against to hazardous cargo. Of course, there is 
no doubt that present‘s potential risk capability of terror around the maritime 
shipping. In this regard, the concerning state has to take measures against piracy and 
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terror under the international maritime law. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas 
or the UN Convention on the Law of Sea jointly has provisions against maritime 
terrorism. 
64
Furthermore the IMO should also pay attention to their approach to 
provide application methodologies in the future, not only around the Straits, but also 
in the entire enforcement process of the maritime navigation safety rules.     
Therefore, such a serious collision threat between the tankers and city 
passenger‘s ships is another serious maritime traffic threat in the Straits.  Another 
critical example was the former Soviet Union aircraft carrier Varyag passages. The 
Turkish Government was reluctant to give permission for the Varyag to pass through 
the Bosphorus straits because it thought it was dangerous for the giant engine ship to 
move through the narrow waterways. 
65
Additionally the total tonnage of navy ships in 
the Turkish Straits at any given moment should not exceed 15,000mt, whereas the 
'Varyag' alone displaces 35,000 tons. The Convention also empowers Turkey to deny 
passage to a vessel considered technically unsafe ('Varyag' was a dead ship without 
engines). Escorted by several other tugs and fire-fighting vessels, the transit took 
place on 01 November 2001 with massive media attention. ITC tug 'Solano' escorted 
the vessel during the passage. Immediately after the passage, the transport 
encountered bad weather in the Aegean Sea. The tow wire of the tug 'Havila 
Champion' parted, leaving the 'Varyag' adrift in the Greek Archipelago. With little 
time left before stranding, the 'Havila Champion'managed to make an emergency 
connection. Escorted by several other tugs and fire-fighting vessels, the transit took 
place on 01 November 2001 with massive media attention. 
66
 Of course, modern 
global economy dependence with high ratio oil and hydrocarbon products in using 
industrialized features of distribution of economic circulation. But we should 
understand to share both mechanisms that help environmental prevention as an 
institutionalized point in order to survive marine navigation from the Turkish Straits.  
International law of sea should have an immediate focus on using effective 
implementation navigation safety rules and preventive environmental diplomacy 
methodologies to promote the free of passage not only through the Straits but also 
through all sea routes and aspirations of freedom. Those efforts in maritime shipping 
community should develop the rules against the global terrorism. As addressed above, 
the ultimate message of this paper can be found in the statement of Jacques-Yves 
Cousteau, there is only one pollution; it is water pollution, because everything ends 
up in the water.‖ 67 
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